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Abstract
Unlike the first generation of critical theorists, contemporary critical theory has largely
ignored technology. This is to the detriment of a critical theory of society – technology is
now a central feature of our daily lives and integral to the contemporary form of
capitalism. Rather than seek to rescue the first generation’s substantive theory of
technology, which has been partly outmoded by historical developments, the approach
adopted in this article is to engage with today’s technology through the conceptual
apparatus offered by the early Frankfurt School. This rationale is guided by the conviction
that the core ideas of critical theory still offer a sound basis for assessing the nature of
technology today. Through a reconstruction and engagement with some of the core
concepts of first-generation critical theory, as well as the work of Bernard Stiegler and
Andrew Feenberg, we can arrive at a more robust theory of technology, capable of
critically interrogating the role of technology in contemporary society.
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The critical theory of the early Frankfurt School offers one of the most important
engagements with technology in modern thought. This paper revisits this rich scholar-
ship to assess current developments in technology. While the writings of Frankfurt
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School theorists have been much discussed, there is still scope for further reflection on
the place and significance of technology in critical theory. Unlike the first generation of
critical theorists, contemporary critical theory has largely ignored technology. Two
exceptions stand out. Hartmut Rosa, in a significant work on acceleration as a key
dynamic in modernity, has incorporated an account of technology, although it is not his
aim primarily to offer a theory of technology as such (Rosa, 2013). The prodigious work
of Andrew Feenberg has cast considerable light on the question of technology in critical
theory, while bringing it into productive dialogue with Science and Technology Studies
(STS). This paper in part builds upon his work, as well as that of Bernard Stiegler, but
offers a different approach to the problem of technology as regards its philosophical
grounding. It is not the aim of this paper to offer a new theory of technology as such; nor
is the objective to salvage the now somewhat opaque theories of technology advanced by
first generation Frankfurt School scholars.
Instead, our strategy is to re-approach the question of technology through the more
general framework of critical theory, rather than specifically taking that tradition’s own
account of technology as the principal basis. This rationale is guided by the conviction
that the core ideas of critical theory offer a basis for assessing the nature of technology
today. However, to develop this we need to go beyond the theory of technology as such
in critical theory. Through a reconstruction of some of the core concepts of critical
theory, we can identify limits in past and contemporary scholarship and can arrive at a
more robust theory of technology. The central question, then, that this paper is addressed
to is: how should technology be understood when viewed through the lens of critical
theory?
To answer this question an account of the theory of technology across critical theory
will be provided as a starting point. The second section offers a contemporary assessment
of the relevance of the theory of technology in critical theory, taking recent literature on
digitization and surveillance capitalism as examples that appear to confirm the prognoses
of first-generation critical theory. While broadly sympathetic to the concerns of critical
theorists in their critique of technology, it is argued that we need to expand, and further
develop, their ideas. The third section looks at other approaches to technology which
either go beyond critical theory (STS, Stiegler, for example), or, as in the case of
Feenberg’s work, seek a synthesis. We argue that these alternative approaches to tech-
nology, while correcting many of the shortcomings of critical theory, do not offer an
adequate solution to the problems they grapple with. The latter sections of the paper seek
to resolve these problems by providing a brief reconstruction of some of the core con-
cepts of critical theory (Section IV) and then recasting contemporary technology through
this framing (Section V).
I The question of technology in critical theory
One prominent feature of the early Frankfurt School, unlike post-Habermasian currents,
was that it was very concerned with technology. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the
question of technology was closely connected with the question of nature itself.1 A
superficial view might be that this was an expression of the disdain for modernity that
was a pronounced feature of European thought in the first half of the 20th century.2 The
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disdain with technology was especially prevalent in conservative critiques of modernity,
as in the work of Spengler (1926 [1918]), Mumford (1934), Gehlen (1989 [1957]) and
Ellul (1964 [1954]). Such themes are also pertinent in Martin Heidegger’s work;3 in an
influential essay in 1954, Heidegger saw a fundamental discord between the actuality
of technology in modernity and an alternative deriving from its hidden ‘essence’
(Heidegger, 1977). Whatever this alternative was, it was not consonant with modernity.
While the Frankfurt School’s critique of technology shared this anti-technological
inflection, which was not unconnected with their dislike of the USA with which the
triumph of technology was associated, it was predicated on very different assumptions
about modernity and future possibility. Frankfurt School scholars were primarily critical
of the association of technological advancement with progress and, unlike the conser-
vative critique of technology, they saw a close connection between technology and
capitalism. Moreover, there is no indication of nostalgia for a pre-technological past in
the Frankfurt School texts. While Adorno and Horkheimer are deeply critical of the
instrumental, identity-thinking characteristics of Enlightened thought, their immanent-
transcendent methodology retains an investment in the latent potentialities of the present.
In short, the present requires the rational critique of irrationality, not a regression to a
pre-technological age. Despite their deep pessimism about the future, the past could not
offer a refuge from the present.
The Frankfurt School account of technology was significantly shaped by Marx and
Weber. Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness (1923) is perhaps the foremost
exposition of their synthesis in Western Marxism: drawing equally on Marx’s theory of
capitalism and the Weberian theory of rationalization. This framework allowed first
generation Frankfurt School scholars to go beyond Marx’s view of technology as
machinery: as something which complements labour, while remaining substantially
distinct. Unlike much of later Marxist theory, they also did not see technology as simply
reducible to capitalism but identified technology as having its own dynamics. Although
Weber operated with a reduced notion of ‘Technik’ as a form of instrumental rationality
distinct from value rationality, his wider theory of rationalization, as exemplified in the
famous motif of the ‘iron cage’, gave a crucial sociological foundation for an account of
technology as a form of instrumental rationality. Capitalism could thus be conceived of
as being both technologically driven while being an expression of something more
pervasive, namely instrumental rationality.
With this concept, which in effect was the master concept through which early critical
theory came to understand domination, technology could be viewed through a Marxist
perspective while simultaneously going beyond it in capturing its cultural dimensions. In
contrast to the conservative critique of technology, its positive aspects could also be seen
in making possible new cultural realities. In this respect, the writings of Benjamin are
important. Benjamin was sensitive to the new kinds of aesthetic experience emerging
technologies made possible, and conscious that the ‘aura of the work of art’ would not
survive in the age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1973: 223). Modern culture is
no longer based on an original that has a presence in time and space. Technology allows
culture to be free from the burden of aura and authenticity that previously tied aesthetics
to tradition. Modern culture is post-auratic, which leads to the ‘shattering of tradition’
that comes with a change in perspective.
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While Benjamin saw modern technology creating a potential for radical cultural
transformation, Adorno argued that he did not sufficiently consider the capacity of
capitalism to create a culture industry that would thrive on the new possibilities for
entertainment and enable a pseudo-authenticity. Benjamin’s work nonetheless brought
new perspectives to bear on technology and culture that greatly influenced critical theory
in the critique of popular culture. It also captured the ambivalence at the heart of modern
technology between its redemptive and its regressive character. However, there can be
no doubt that the understanding of technology as primarily regressive prevailed. Adorno
and Horkheimer (1997 [1944]), in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, clearly held a critical
view of technology as an instrument of domination and a major source of reification. In
later writings, Adorno saw potentially progressive applications in the use of radio as
opposed to the television, which he regarded as fundamentally regressive.4 Yet, as
evidenced by Minima Moralia (1978 [1951]), there is little doubt that Adorno over-
whelmingly saw technology as an expression of an instrumental rationality which
induces reification and dispels the critical temperament.
A basic problem with which first-generation critical theorists grappled is the
separation of means from ends in the conception of technology. Unlike Arendt and
Heidegger, who also saw in technology the triumph of means over ends, they did not see
the solution to be a return to an earlier stage in the history of humanity when technology
remained goal oriented, as in Arendt’s (1958) account of the tool model of technology
where humanity was in control of technology. But with the arrival of the age of
instrumentalism technology loses that direct relation to a goal. For critical theory, the
aim is rather to reassert goals than bemoan modern technology as such.
Marcuse provided the classic account of technology in critical theory as a form of
‘technocracy’. In ‘Some Implications of Modern Technology’, Marcuse (1982 [1941])
argued that technology can promote authoritarianism and that the Third Reich had clear
technocratic elements which accelerated its transition into a war economy. For Marcuse,
creeping technocracy precipitated a substantial change in social relationships, which
were increasingly mediated by mechanical processes. Modern technological rationality,
manifest in industrial capitalism, is based on convenience, efficiency, standardization; it
leads to adjustment and atomization, and the loss of personal autonomy. Technological
rationality erodes critical rationality. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse’s critique of
technology became part of a more general critique of ideology: technology is presented
as both a means of social control and an ideology in itself. It is an ideology in the sense
that the pervasive spread of technological rationality makes impossible the conception of
an alternative society or way of thinking.
Despite the confluence of technology and capitalism, Marcuse nonetheless believed
that a critical rationality can prevail, but only if it resists technological rationality and
creates a radically different society. The problem, then, is not technology, but tech-
nocracy. The 1941 essay clearly opposes anti-technological politics such as an ‘anti-
industrial revolution’. His position is one in which technology can be humanized and
democratized against technocracy.
For all his utopianism, Marcuse had no sense of how a post-capitalist society would be
realized. Despite achieving unusual resonance with the students’ movement, his ‘new
sensibility’ lacked an accompanying formulated philosophy of transition. He certainly
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was not naive enough to think that emergent technology would deliver a socialist future.
However, he did see the necessity for technology to be part of the creation of a more
human future. His understanding of technology – in contrast to the camera in Benjamin
or the radio with Adorno – was limited to examples that fall into the category of
industrial standardization, such as the Fordist assembly line. But this is also complicated.
The instrumental and the cultural dimensions of technology cannot be separated. Con-
sider the case of a washing machine, which liberates people, historically predominantly
women, from tedious gendered work, but is also an item of consumption and a major
product of industrial capitalism. The washing machine does not in itself make possible
critical thought but creates a space for cultural transformation. Instrumental kinds of
industrial technology can be used for human liberation, but they are also at the very core
of capitalism. A post-capitalist society cannot do without such items even if it is indeed
possible that entirely new kinds of technology could be created. The reality is that
technological products are produced under the conditions of capitalism.
Marcuse is clear that technology is not neutral but embedded in social relations and in
systems of production: ‘Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is
put; the technological society is a system of domination’ (1964: xvi). A machine can be
neutral in the sense it can be used for different purposes, but it is always located in a
social context (see also Marcuse, 1989 [1958–9]). While making material progress
possible, including an improved quality of life, technology produces a new unfreedom
because it prevents the individual from becoming autonomous and people come to see
themselves only in their commodities. In the final analysis, technology leads to reifi-
cation and enables social control to become anchored in the new needs which capitalism
produces.
Marcuse’s target is not in the end technology but what he calls ‘technological
rationality’, or technocracy: the instrumental use of technology for domination. This
includes the more general worship of technology as the ultimate expression of modernity
(see also Noble, 1999; Nye, 1994). Reverence of technology cultivates an affirmative
view of society and thus conceals an ideology of uncritical acceptance. Since his account
of technology did not discuss specific technologies, other than passing references to the
iconic consumer goods of post-war American society such as the TV and the car, it is
more plausible to see his account of technology in terms of its instrumentalization
without any regard for desirable political goals.
The entire critical theory tradition, based as it was on German intellectuals born in the
early 20th century, inherited the 19th-century German tendency to see technology in
terms of Technik (instrumentalism/technique). With the ascendancy of German engi-
neering and the growing status of science in the 19th century, the notion of Technik
gained currency and the term was adopted in the human and social sciences. It replaced
the older and more cultural notion of Technologia, which emerged in the 16th century
around the science of the arts (Schatzberg, 2018). Technik, the term, used by both Marx
and Weber and other German scholars such as Sombart and Heidegger, was introduced
into the English-speaking world by German intellectuals to give the older notion of
technology a new meaning that reflected the dominance of science and related to the
material aspects of civilization.
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The result was a bifurcation in the cultural and the instrumental conception of
technology, whereby the term lost its cultural associations with the Greek notion of
techne, which contained notions of craft and art in contrast to episteme, denoting
knowledge. The notion of technology, including the term itself, when it emerged in the
16th century captured both episteme and techne until it was re-invented around a sci-
entific conception. Technology as a term was not in common usage until the 1940s, when
it re-emerged to mean much the same as Technik. But the creative and cultural dimension
of the older notion of technology was not entirely expunged. It was supposed to be
contained in part in Technik, in that science, the basis of technology, requires the creative
power of invention and is thus, in part, cultural. However, this notion of Technik did not
satisfy a wider and more encompassing conception of technology that could accom-
modate what Heidegger referred to as the ‘essence’ of technology. This new notion of
technology sought to capture both the instrumental and the cultural dimensions of
technology, but in a way that gave prominence to its material aspects. It was undoubtedly
this notion of technology that lay behind Marcuse’s theory of technology and which can
be seen to contrast with the more conservative critiques of technology.
After the first generation of critical theory, the theory of technology disappeared from
the horizon of critical theory. Habermas’s work has given scant attention to technology.
An exception was a 1968 essay, with the telling title of ‘Technik und Wissenschaft als
“Ideologie”’, in which Habermas takes issue with what he saw to be Marcuse’s belief in a
‘New Science’ that would make possible a New Technology. Habermas disagrees with
this utopianism, seeing technology as residing within the domain of purposive-rational
action. For Habermas, technology qua Technik is a matter of the technical control of
nature and thus to a degree is neutral, so long as it is confined to that domain. Com-
municative rationality, in contrast, is not primarily instrumental but social. The upshot of
this reasoning is that technology is not social as such and is therefore excluded from
communicative action. Such a position seems comprehensively outdated by the rise of
social media.
Habermas’s argument is that since the end of the 19th century there has been a
tendency towards the ‘scientization of technology’ whereby science and technology have
become a leading productive force and an integral part of capitalism (see also Habermas
1975). Technology, and the science that makes it possible, cannot lead to emancipation
since they have become a substitute for politics which becomes only a technocratic
matter of finding technical solutions to societal problems. Technology is ideological in
that political solutions are seen as technical ones. In the final analysis, Habermas agrees
with Marcuse that technological rationality invades the social world, distorting com-
municative rationality.
Later critical theory has been muted on technology. Habermas’s major works did not
give any place to technology, which has generally been seen as an expression of
instrumental rationality and related to systemic integration. With the underlying sense
of Technik, non-instrumental forces are necessarily seen as residing outside the compass
of technology. The basic assumption that pervades his work, that technology is non-
social, is deeply problematical, as is the contrary view that technology is necessarily a
form of domination. The claim made in Knowledge and Human Interests, that knowl-
edge of nature is based on prediction, is also very questionable in its assumption that
6 Thesis Eleven XX(X)
predictive-based knowledge is value free if not applied to the social world. Habermas’s
objection was against the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the human
and social sciences. While this generated important insights in the shaping of post-
positivistic social science, it did not question the rationality of the natural sciences.
The problem is that the critical theory tradition can see technology only in terms of the
model of machinery or a non-social instrument, and that it is in tension with the social
nature of human action.
It is clear that Habermas has held to a contradictory position that saw technology as
outside the domain of the life-world and therefore as non-social, while at the same time it
is a possible source of domination, as when it becomes a substitute for politics. This
position commits him to a view of domination as non-social. As Feenberg (1996) has
shown, Habermas is committed to a view of technology as essentially neutral in that it is
bound up with what he called a cognitive interest in technical control, as announced in
Knowledge and Human Interests in 1968 (Habermas, 1974).5 Later developments in
critical theory, as in Honneth’s theory of recognition, have ignored the place of tech-
nology. However relations of recognition are to be conceived, it is difficult to avoid the
question of technology in mediating such relations. In a similar view, the various con-
cerns of contemporary critical theory, whether in normative political philosophy or in
post-colonial critiques, the question of technology remains curiously absent.6
II Rethinking technology: Was the Frankfurt School right?
It is clearly necessary for critical theory to take a new look at technology, which is part of
the fabric of social life and constitutive of the ontology of the social (see Lawson, 2018).
Two possible options can be identified before moving to an alternative. The first is to try
to rescue the theory of technology contained in the writings of the first generation of the
Frankfurt School and to apply it to developments of the present day (the second is
discussed in the next section). Despite the problems intimated in the previous discussion,
their basic ideas are by no means to be dismissed as irrelevant today. Recent literature on
technocratic power in many ways confirms their conception of technology as the all-
pervasive growth of instrumental rationality. It is true that their work was primarily
concerned with the expansion of industrialism, while today, in the post-industrial digital
age, the nature of technology has fundamentally changed. The tremendous transfor-
mation in the technological foundations of contemporary society show too that tech-
nology is not stable but in constant change. However, that may in fact be precisely why
technology has the potential to be a major form of domination.
The Frankfurt School’s critique of technology has exerted considerable appeal in
contemporary scholarship due to its central concern with instrumental rationality and
related technocratic forms of power. An illustrative example is Berry’s (2014) theory of
the shift from the culture industry to the computational industries. Berry seeks to apply
critical theory to the digital age to understand the dialectic of its democratizing and
totalizing powers. His work captures the ambivalence of the Frankfurt School. On the
one side, digital technologies are presented as calculative rationalities, yet it is clear that
they have gone beyond purely instrumental uses for production and the storage of
information. Digital technologies are also empowering but can easily become
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instruments of reification and the basis of new kinds of governmentality (Berns and
Rouvroy, 2013).
This perspective is present in other contemporary literature, which recalls the
Frankfurt School’s critique of technology. Seymour (2019) sees the dystopian world of
platform capitalism as extracting the affective, individual particularities of platform
users and repackaging their desires, hopes and communicative expressions as a com-
modity experience. Twitter is presented as akin to the ‘Twittering Machine’ of the Paul
Klee painting: blending humanity and machinery into an artifice of self-perpetuating
commodification, instrumentality, and extraction. Similarly, James Bridle’s New Dark
Age (2018) reconstructs the approach to technology presented in Dialectic of Enlight-
enment for today’s digital world. For Bridle, the paradoxical irony is that the more
information we are exposed to, our capacity to identify ‘truth’ from ‘post-truth’ is
proportionally impaired. The logics which perpetuate the effortless dissemination of
‘information’ serve to sever our capacity for critical inquiry. For Bridle, what seems to
have been a democratization of information exchange is in fact an expedited elite-
capture of information exchange processes. While the process of book and article
publication is comprehensible, if inaccessible to most, few beyond a small group of
experts understands, and determines, the algorithms undergirding digital platforms.
Bridle’s account also furthers two other, central Frankfurt School themes. While for
Adorno, a foundational deficiency of Enlightened thought was the rise of ‘identity
thinking’, which led to the conceptual domination of the particular, for Bridle, the
information age has precipitated the rise of ‘information thinking’. This is the mistaken
belief that all problems can be solved by computerized systems if enough data can be
harvested. While Horkheimer wrote that the Enlightenment reduced nature to ‘a heap of
things’ (1993: 81), and Marcuse submitted that technological modernity led to the ascent
of the ‘technological a priori’ (Marcuse, 1964), Bridle similarly claims that the infor-
mation age has led to subjects who view the world as resembling computational potential
and raw data. As data is an abstract, weak representation of the richness of social reality,
our phenomenological experience of the social world, and our attendant appreciation of
it, diminishes (Bridle, 2018: 43).
Reading these accounts of the transformation of technology and its extension into the
inner realms of subjectivity, there is a certain fatalistic sense of technological deter-
minism at work, akin to the ‘iron cage’ of rationalization described by Weber. However,
from a critical theory perspective, the transformation of society by technology is not to
be accounted for by technology in itself. The digital age is held to be predominantly a
product of capitalism but also of counter-vailing forces. While the origins of the internet
do not lie specifically within capitalism, the internet developed within the structures of
capitalism, and is substantially driven by the imperatives of capitalist accumulation.
Zuboff’s analysis of ‘surveillance capitalism’ serves to draw out the particularities of
this relationship. She argues that the digital economy has created a new kind of capit-
alism based on surveillance. For Zuboff, the accumulation of big data produces a
‘behavioural surplus’ which is used not only to predict human behaviour but also to
modify it (Zuboff, 2019: 8). The product is a new kind of commodity whereby the user
provides the input in the form of behavioural data, which is then used to predict the
behaviour of the user. Her argument takes up one of the main themes in the critical
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theory of the Frankfurt School concerning the commodification of technocratic power.
Surveillance capitalism gives rise to a new kind of power, which she terms ‘instru-
mentarianism’. This is held to exert a powerful hold over society through a complex
system of ‘smart’ networked devices. The new capitalism may be a post-industrial form
of capitalism, but it remains, nonetheless, capitalism. The population as a whole, the
users of Google, Facebook, Amazon, etc., provide the raw material, which, in effect, is
their lives. This is not too far removed from Marcuse’s account of the ‘one-dimensional
society’ where workers continue to serve capitalism through the appropriation of free
time when leisure is the prolongation of work.
A further theorist who has successfully deployed Frankfurt School themes to engage
the challenges of contemporary technological societies is Christian Fuchs. In Critical
Theory of Communication (2016), Fuchs stresses that the Habermasian theory of com-
municative action (Habermas, 1986, 1988) is impotent to explain the myriad intersecting
forces which impact the communicative realm in the digital information age. By way of
an alternative, Fuchs returns to Marcuse, Adorno and Lukacs to construct a dialectical
theory of communication. Yet, Fuchs’ account also seeks to move beyond the traditional
Frankfurt School understanding of technology, and he stresses the importance of
engaging with both lesser-known works by Lukács – for instance, his Ontology of Social
Being (1978) – and a range of other thinkers who are not usually considered to be part of
the Frankfurt School tradition: Vygotsky, Baudrillard, Williams. Fuchs thus retains an
investment in the critical theoretical apparatus for engaging with technology but moves
beyond the canonical authors.
The various literature discussed in the foregoing shows that the writings of the
Frankfurt School on technology are very pertinent to the different circumstances of the
present. Their work reveals that technology is not neutral but that it is shaped by society
and driven by capitalism. All the major digital corporations are capitalistic businesses
whose driving force is the profit imperative.
However, it must also be recognized that despite their extensive power, digital
technologies are not total systems of control. This is perhaps where critical theory is
weak in that it does not offer enough insight into how technocratic power can be con-
trolled, resisted and mobilized by critical publics. Yet, a distinctive dimension of critical
theory is that it does seek to bring a normative perspective to bear on domination, even if
it is not clear how the normative order of society can assert itself over surveillance
capitalism and the forms of technology it has cultivated. This is especially challenging in
that any such alternatives will have to use much the same forms of technology. The
challenge of bringing mega-digital giants such as Facebook under democratic control of
the constitutional state through legislation for privacy, criminality and the political use of
data is compromised by the fact that the state is itself undermined by the very forces it
seeks to control. As Marcuse argued in One-Dimensional Man, technology is not neutral,
it is socially situated within particular social conditions: within a relationship between
‘science’, ‘technology’ and the mode of production. Hence Marcuse calls for a ‘new
sensibility’, a new way of engaging with the world at large, including the technical
objects which proliferate within the social domain. As Marcuse argues, technology is
neither neutral to the social order, nor intrinsically good or bad. Digital technologies
retain a substantial latent potential to be emancipatory, to further communicative
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exchange and to reduce unnecessary toil and suffering. The challenge for critical theory
is to extricate such potentialities from the logics of domination within which they are
situated, and which, to a great extent, they currently serve to perpetuate.
Digital apps, such as those used by Amazon, Uber, and Facebook, can be used for
both good and bad purposes. Surveillance capitalism is certainly capable of considerable
manipulation of user behaviour through covert and often illegal practices. When this
extends to voter behaviour, as in the practice of political parties buying Facebook ads,
there is a new area that presents major challenges for democracy.7 Despite the propensity
for domination, digital technology has diverse applications and can also facilitate a
critical rationality as much as enable an all-pervasive technical rationality. This is where
critical theory needs to rethink its theory of technology, the analysis of which does not
appear consistent with the basic idea of immanent critique (see Section V).
III Beyond the Frankfurt School’s critique of technology
The previous section offered a possible line of defence of the Frankfurt School’s theory
of technology. Despite the fundamental difference between the kinds of technology the
first generation had in mind and the new digital technologies of the present, there is
considerable resonance in the notion of instrumental rationality. The apparent growth of
new and pervasive technocratic domination is clearly something that needs to be
explained in a way that brings a normative perspective to bear. But beyond that general
position, there can be no doubt that the critical theoretical engagement with technology
thus far has too little to offer. This becomes all the clearer when we look at recent critical
theory which fails to provide anything of a substantive account of social life and its
material conditions of existence.
One major limitation of critical theory’s own account of technology is that it operates
with the notion of technology as Technik. This instrumental conception of technology
does not accord with the social ontology of technology which does not conform to the
older notions of automation and de-humanization. While Habermas wrote on contrasting
‘communicative’ and ‘instrumental’ rationalities and identified divergent systemic and
lifeworld logics, today the fabric of social life is thoroughly interwoven with techno-
logical processes. As such, it is impossible to consistently hold that technology resides
within a separate social domain, distinct from communicative or other forms of social
interaction: we daily communicate via WhatsApp, Instagram, Hangouts, Skype. The new
technologies of digital modernity are not static and Fordist but, portable, personalized
and, increasingly, intangible. We pay for our drinks from our digital wallets, we may
even store our capital in cryptocurrency. Digital technologies mark both new and
changing affordances and new discourses about social reality. For Fischer (2010: 235),
this notion of technology as discourse is productive insofar as it captures the capacity for
technology to give form to, and shape, our social worlds. We cannot exist beyond
technology and increasingly cannot comprehend social life without it. This may in part
explain the sense of shock at the realization that YouTube is just over a decade old:
digital technologies have reshaped our conception of social reality to an extent it is
increasingly difficult to imagine a world without them. Byung-Chul Han’s (2017a,
2017b) work takes this further, arguing that our capacity to appreciate both beauty and
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love has been reshaped in various ways by our total enmeshment within technical-
consumerist rationalities. As such, the understanding of technology as primarily a
vehicle for the spread of instrumental rationality, as evinced in Lukács and Weber, is not
adequate to understand technology’s constitutive role in contemporary social life.
The limitations of critical theory’s account of technology have led to other approaches
to engaging with technology within social theory.8 These will not be discussed in any
detail here, other than to indicate the main lines of theorizing and taking Stiegler and
Feenberg as major proponents of a critical theory of technology.
Bernard Stiegler’s work offers an elaborate framework for a new approach to tech-
nology. In Technics and Time, he argued that both the subject’s capacity for transcen-
dence and the subject’s imagination of transcendence are thoroughly imbricated within a
world of technics (1998; also Stiegler, 2008, 2011). His core insight is that technics lies
at the core of human experience and of time. Human existence is necessarily embedded
in temporality, but we can access our past temporality only through technics, which is
not reducible to instrumentality, as Heidegger believed. Action requires technics, which
also offers an opening to the future. These ideas, developed through a critical engage-
ment with Heidegger and various French philosophers, have been more recently applied
to a critical philosophy of the internet, which is very much in keeping with the Frankfurt
School’s theory of technology but incorporates a stronger argument for an alternative
technology. In The Neganthropocene (2018) and in a collection he edited, La toile que
nous voulons [The Internet We Want] (2017), Stiegler argued for a technology that is
based less on ‘entropy’ (essentially the movement towards fragmentation, destabilization
and disorder) than on ‘negantrophy’, a concept that expresses a form of integration that
makes possible human flourishment and care (Stiegler, 2017, 2018). Today technology,
above all digital technology, is moving the world towards entropy, but must be resisted.
The ‘internet we want’ is a social network that serves human needs rather than the needs
of capitalism.
Despite his critique of the descent into nihilistic entropy as a result of the hegemony
of algorithmic surveillance, automation and the dominance of digital capitalism, Stiegler
is optimistic about the potential for a radical transformation of the internet and the search
for a remedy for a civilization that has become ill. These ideas, expanded in Age of
Disruption (Stiegler, 2019 [2016]), also reveal his debt to the argument of the Dialectic
of Enlightenment concerning the barbarism of reason. In the end it would seem the
countervailing forces of negantrophy are overwhelmed by the descent into entropy.
Stiegler’s philosophy of technology has much in common with the work of Andrew
Feenberg, who is also broadly sympathetic to the Frankfurt School’s theory of tech-
nology while recognizing the need to go beyond it. Both theorists have much in common:
a critical approach to Heidegger, the abiding influence of the Dialectic of Enlightenment,
and an appreciation of the writings of Simondon. Feenberg, who refers to Stiegler’s
work, argues for the synthesis of critical theory and the constructivist approaches
characteristic of Science and Technology Studies. The latter is clearly the most influ-
ential approach to both the theory of technology as well as empirical research. Like
critical theory, STS is anti-technocratic and an expression of radical thought, though its
inspiration derives from postmodern theory rather than from modern thought. Perhaps
one difference is that it is more explicitly anti-deterministic than what one might
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conclude from the Frankfurt School’s writings. Although they opposed technological
determinism, the Frankfurt School theorists had no real concept of what Feenberg refers
to as ‘democratic interventions’, a concept that is in keeping with Stiegler’s negantrophic
pleas for a new internet (Feenberg, 2017a, 2017b).
STS brings the perspective of the social actor more firmly to bear in the creation of
technological systems, which are never simply self-creating but are context-dependent.9
Adopting a strong constructivist stance, as in the so-called ‘Strong Programme’, STS
theorists tend to see technological systems as products of human artifice and interests
rather than objective structures. In other versions, as in Actor-Network Theory, as
espoused by Latour, John Law, and others, technological systems are amalgams of
objects and social actors. This is not the place to offer an assessment of STS and other
constructivist schools of theory, including Foucauldian applications (see Berns and
Rouvroy, 2013). It will suffice to note that in the present context, the relevant consid-
eration here is the necessity to have a stronger recognition of the individual actor in the
shaping of technological systems, which are not totalizing systems of domination. STS
approaches, and in particular those that reflect ANT perspectives, have the additional
advantage in going beyond the paradigm of Technik that has restricted the vision of the
German tradition in theorizing technology. While this has clearly led to productive
research on technology, it remains unclear what a synthesis of STS and critical theory
can precipitate. Feenberg’s main claim is that it allows us to see technology as embedded
in its social context. That is important but it is hardly an original insight, as Susen (2019)
has pointed out. The tendency in ANT is clearly towards posthumanism in its aim to go
beyond the distinction between humans and nonhumans. Whatever the merits of this may
be, it is not easy to reconcile STS’s post-humanism with the essential humanism of
critical theory. This is one small disagreement we have with Feenberg.
However, more importantly, Feenberg’s aim is to develop a notion of democratic
interventions into what he calls ‘the technosystem’, in effect the task of bringing tech-
nocratic power under the control of democratic bodies. Feenberg is correct in showing
that STS approaches offer a corrective to the tendency in critical theory to see technology
as primarily a force of domination and reification. Communicative forms of rationality,
to follow Habermas, can exist alongside instrumental rationality. However, culture and
power are not separate forces. The great contribution of Feenberg’s recent work is the
demonstration that ‘the technical is already cultural’ (2017a: 153). What he calls the
‘technosystem’ is composed of different components, which are never reducible only to
technology. They entail markets, administrative and legal systems, for example, and are
contextualized in moral systems and forms of life. Democratic interventions can occur
on different levels. It is not a case of a monolithic edifice facing hostile opponents.
In a recent and deeply insightful article, Feenberg, taking the example of the internet,
shows how technology – a term that can now be used to capture the notion of Technics –
can offer great promise for democracy without succumbing to technocracy (Feenberg,
2019). The core of his arguments resides in the claim that that the internet, which is not a
unified entity, reshapes political participation through processes of mediation and by
enabling the raising of consciousness, leading to self-awareness and action. While the
emancipatory core of the first decade of the internet has been lost with the dominance of
an instrumental digital capitalism, the internet has the potential to harness the legacy of
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the New Left and advance democratic socialism, which will require a new mode of
governance that cannot do without technical expertise. This is ultimately because ‘the
internet is a medium of communication, it cannot be contained within the bounds of the
economy’ (Feenberg, 2019: 238).
In sum, rather than trying to salvage the Frankfurt School’s theory of technology, as
discussed above, there are clearly alternative approaches available to advance it. Taken
together, there may be some merit in a new synthesis of these critical theories of tech-
nology. The aim of this paper is not to argue against this strategy or to offer a rebuttal of
STS/constructivist approaches, which in fact are less theories than methodologies. The
contribution of the present paper is to show that if we go beyond the Frankfurt School’s
own theory of technology and approach the question of technology from the more
general framework of critical theory, a distinctive understanding of technology can be
reached. The writings of Stiegler and Feenberg offer good directions in this endeavour.
One striking aspect of their work insofar as it concerns the internet is the implicit sug-
gestion, which recalls Marcuse’s vision of a ‘new science’, that the internet offers the
possibility of a new technology. We do not disagree with these arguments but seek to
situate the vision of technology they advance within the wider theoretical framework of
critical theory, as opposed to its theory of technology. To understand the transformative
potential of technology, we need to locate it within something that goes beyond tech-
nology itself. In other words, with an ironic reference to Heidegger, the essence of
technology is in an understanding of the social world of which it is part. But to take this
further we need recourse to a theoretical framework. This brings us back to the core
concerns of critical theory.
IV Critical theory revisited
Critical theory is distinctive in its focus on identifying discourses and practices that hold
radical transformative potential. This concern derives from the left-Hegelian roots of the
Frankfurt School project: the dialectical method focuses on discovering contradictions
and avenues for their sublation. For the purposes of the present paper we limit our
discussion to a brief summary.
Unlike Ideal Theory,10 for example, an immanent-transcendence approach engages
with social reality itself and seeks to identify latent phenomena within the social world
which push actors to transcend the given social formation and its associated norms.
This may occur due to actors being confronted with the explicitly contradictory nature
of social logics.11 The disclosure of such contradictions serves to compel social actors
to challenge, and move beyond, the social and self-understandings imbued by the
dominant structural logics. As such, following Strydom, immanent-transcendence is
connected to the development of social learning processes and changing under-
standings of the social world (Strydom, 2020).
The Hegelian concept of latency is significant to the immanent-transcendence
approach: there are possibilities for change which exist within the present social order
(Hegel, 2010: S47, S62). The central component required for social subjects to transcend
the dominant social norms is the awareness of a less contradictory form of social reason,
or social being, pregnant within the social order. The possibilities for transcendence are
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thus held to be present within the immanent social world; the challenge for critical theory
is to disclose these potentialities. Such avenues for transcendence are revealed by either
their embodiment in cultural models (i.e. democratic systems, the law, erotic-mimetic
experience) or through the mediating influence of concepts and norms (equality, free-
dom, etc.).
Critical theory’s commitment to immanent-transcendence precipitates a particular
form of social critique: immanent-critique. As expressed above, the focus is on social
reality, and identifying possibilities for transcendence within the contradictions present
in the social order. This conception of critique is reflexive insofar as it is predicated on
the disclosure of a divergence between the subject’s self-identified norms and ideals and
their manifest social actuality. By disclosing these contradictions both the essential
requirement for, and possibilities of, transcendence emerge. This emancipatory impetus
connects to the Freudian belief in the subject’s anxiety response to the awareness of
unsustainable contradictions. The subject desires resolution in the form of transcen-
dence. Immanent critique is thus based on the analysis of deep potentialities and social
learning processes borne out of subjects’ anxious drive to transcend disquieting con-
tradictions (Honneth, 2014: 686–90). This psychoanalytic impulse is conjoined with the
reflexive drive to transcend the discrepancy between idea and reality within the subject’s
social self-understanding.
Intimately connected to this immanent-transcendent approach is critical theory’s
focus on social rationality. Returning to the Hegelian reworking of the Kantian under-
standing of ‘regulative ideas of reason’, critical theory views the social totality to be a
manifestation of dominant forms of rationality. ‘Reason’, from such a perspective, is
held to be both a cognitive capacity of social subjects and also manifest in the logics and
structures of social institutions: the market, democracy, cultural forms. To speak of the
capitalist market as manifesting a form of reason is to suggest there is a particular form of
thought which is perpetuated by, and manifested in, systems of market exchange (for
example). For first generation Frankfurt School scholars, this capitalist form of thought
was pathologically ‘instrumental’, connected to viewing the world as mere material for
exploitation and extraction. For Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1944]), this market
logic was connected to a foundational limitation of the ‘identity thinking’ precipitated by
the Enlightenment, in which the particularities of the social world are understood as mere
contingent manifestations of universal concepts. Clearly such claims are distinct from
the idea that the social world perpetuates ‘norms’ or ‘values’; for critical theorists, the
claim is that social institutions are both a product of, and yet crucially also bring forth,
primary generative social processes.
Such an account does not necessitate a hard determinism. As expressed above,
social subjects both operate within, and serve to challenge, dominant social forms of
rationality. As the contradictions embedded in social processes are disclosed by
historical processes, subjects challenge the generative forces, seeking alternative,
non-subsumptive rationalities. The critical theoretical investment in immanent-
transcendence is best framed relative to the challenge of locating emancipatory
potential within the social world which can help disclose contradictions within man-
ifest social rationality.
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Yet, critical theory does not solely aim to advance a critique connected to the dis-
closure of contradictions. In addition to being ‘critical’ the tradition has always been
invested in ‘theorizing’: in placing social-cultural logics within their broader context.
Once again resonating with Hegelian themes, critical theorists consider it essential to
understand the relational nature of social phenomena, and as such they champion an
explicitly interdisciplinary form of analysis. The interconnections between subjectivity,
economy, culture, psychology, and geography are all objects of analysis. Indeed, the
latticework which is the social totality is held to be undergirded by logics which are
latent with emancipatory potential. It is often at the intersections of competing social
rationalities that the potential for rupture is greatest. Thus, to truly understand the
contradictions within the social order, critical theorists seek to theorize the locatedness of
contested social practices. In particular, the relationships between subjectivity, ration-
ality, reflexivity, objectivity and latency need to be critically theorized.
In summary, critical theory is distinct in its focus on identifying possibilities for
transcendence within the social world. It offers both a unique form of critique and a
substantial theory, locating social practices within the complex enmeshment of com-
peting social logics. A central feature of the critical theoretical method is a ‘thicker’,
Hegelian-inflected understanding of reason: the idea being that social processes and
institutions are both instantiations of, and serve to precipitate, forms of rationality.
Technology, as shown below, when viewed through such a lens, presents as a sub-
stantially more ambivalent force than the negativity of early critical theorists might
suggest.
V Considerations towards a contemporary critical theory of
technology
While it is not our desire to present a new critical theory of technology within this article,
what we seek to offer is the identification of themes which come to the fore when
technology is viewed through the lens of critical theory. Our submission is that the
conceptual frameworks developed by first-generation critical theory offer important
insights for exploring technology today. Following Strydom (2020), we contend that the
immanent-transcendent approach, unique to critical theory, would suggest an analysis of
the potentialities and actualities which technology presents to the social world. Such an
approach would focus on identifying possibilities for transcendence through the iden-
tification of contradictions within the interwoven nexuses of economic, social, political
and cultural concerns through which contemporary technology is both reflexively
understood and manifested.
A central task for a contemporary critical theory of technology would be to ade-
quately situate technology within the present social totality. As Marcuse (1964) argued
in One-Dimensional Man, and, as discussed in the foregoing, returned to more recently
by Feenberg (2013), technology is not ‘neutral’ in social processes, yet neither is it
inherently a force for emancipation or domination. As Feenberg (2013, 2017a, 2019)
articulates, ‘science’, ‘technology’, and ‘capitalism’ are inextricably connected. In
theory, the emergence of a new economic model could radically transform the function
of technology within society, embracing its emancipatory and world-disclosing
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potentialities. The particularities of the current relationships between ‘science’, ‘tech-
nology’ and ‘capitalism’ are thus of fundamental importance; however, they are yet to be
substantively researched through a critical theory lens. The locatedness of ‘technology’
within neoliberalism, and its problematic contemporary relationship to ‘science’, are
self-evidently a rich site for analysing normative conflicts and thus potentially an avenue
for radical social transformation. However, an alternative economic order will not
emerge on its own. Feenberg (2019) correctly sees the impetus coming from what he
calls democratic rationality opposing instrumental rationality. Both rationalities are
concrete realities and play out against the technical background of social life. This
argument is not unlike Habermas’s account of modernity in terms of a clash of two kinds
of reason, instrumental/functional versus communicative, but differs in seeing tech-
nology as part of the fabric of social life as opposed to being located in one.
While researching the relationships between technology, science and capitalism is an
essential constituent for a future critical theory of technology, to fully understand the
impact of technology on the social totality a much broader engagement is therefore
required. Technology has radically reshaped the global order: the internet connects
people instantly on opposite sides of the globe in exchanges ranging from first dates to
drone attacks. The empirical realities of the globalized world bring forth new and
contested cosmopolitan normativities: in Zuckerman’s (2013) prose, we are increasingly
‘digital cosmopolitans’ living ‘in the age of connection’. Technology must be understood
as central to these processes. Similarly, technology has impacted patriarchal and racist
structures, both with emancipatory and reactionary outcomes (Faulkner, 2001). In
societies with clear gendered divisions of labour, the advent of labour-saving devices
served to liberate women from hours of back-breaking labour. Simultaneously, new
surveillance techniques mean that often racialized care-workers are increasingly mon-
itored and policed. A critical theory of technology today would need to engage with the
complex location of technology within these contested and interconnected social
structures. Such an analysis must seek to locate technology within the broader forms of
reason which exist within the social totality.
While past engagements linking technology and rationality advanced a problematic
bifurcation into ‘technical’ and ‘communicative’ reason, a contemporary critical theory
of technology would need to transcend such a division, which has been rendered
untenable through the evolution of technical-communication affordances. Today, it is
increasingly impossible to consider communication without technology. When analys-
ing how technology has impacted social rationality, two key considerations would need
to be foregrounded.
First, as Marcuse draws out in his understanding of the ‘technical a priori’, technology
shapes how subjects view the world: it shapes their foundational psychological and
cognitive processes. Yet simultaneously, technology is profoundly reshaping the
external world in ways that make social logics harder to identify: our cities are
increasingly augmented by technical affordances, driving us towards ‘hyperreality’
(Baudrillard, 2009). Technology’s impact on the subject’s cognitive capacities is a
primary concern for critical theory, yet so too is the subject’s capacity to identity
divergent layers of ‘reality’ within digital modernity. Today, technology mediates the
subject’s experience of both the objective and intersubjective world; technology is
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increasingly a precondition for subjects to experience mimetic or erotic phenomena:
consider Tinder, Imax cinema, Netflix (Stiegler, 1998, 2008, 2011). A central concern
for a critical theory of contemporary technology is both to understand how the subject’s
form of rationality is impacted by technology and how the subject needs to develop new
cognitive capacities to survive and engage critically with the emergent capitalist
hyperreality. There is no escape for the subject into an isolated a-technological realm;
soon one might even say subjectivation itself requires technological literacy. A central
challenge for a contemporary critical theory of technology would be to research the
impact of technology on the subject’s capacity for critique, for non-instrumental thought,
and the new cognitive capacities required to flourish in digital neoliberalism.
Second, in keeping with the research programme of first-generation critical theory; a
critical theory of technology would need to engage with the impact of technology upon
social rationalities. The dominance of technology serves to naturalize and entrench
extractive market logics based on exchange and efficiency. The central market
imperative of the ruthless extraction of profit is normalized through technological
mediation. Subjects are petrified and commodified in their representation on digital
affordances, reduced to quantitative scores. As technology structures ever more areas of
the social world, subjects have to transform their identities to be legible to new tech-
nological forces. The erasure of the particularities of the subject, and their collapse into
functions, was a central theme of Dialectic of Enlightenment (1997 [1994]). A central
concern for a contemporary critical theory of technology becomes analysing the impact
new technologies have on normalizing and accelerating these dynamics.
A concern uniting research into the foregoing themes would be the identification of
contradictions within the social world which hold latent emancipatory potentials for
transcendence. As presented in the above, a critical theory of technology would provide
an extensive analysis of the normative conflicts which exist at the intersection of
technology and science, and technology and the market. The desires for collegial
scholarship, for shared research, for free-inquiry, and the associated norms of academic
integrity and solidarity are antithetical to the primary market diktat of predictable returns
on investment. As discussed above, ‘technology’ stands in a particularly complex
relationship to capital and to science; changes in the form of either can radically
transform the normative assumptions of the technical sphere. Such normative contra-
dictions are disclosed by the world-expanding character of technology and the cosmo-
politan values which emerge, however latently, in the processes of globalization.
When viewed through the lens of critical theory, technology seems a social domain
ripe with possibilities for precipitating transcendence. A critical theory of technology
would serve to identify such contradictions through an analysis of the relationship between
science, technology and capital, through an analysis of the world-expanding normativities
it precipitates, and the reductive, commodifying impacts technology poses to the subject as
a social being within capitalism, and to the subject’s reflexive self-understanding.
VI Conclusion
Undeniably much has changed in the world, and in technology in particular, since the
writings of the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists. Today, technical
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affordances are increasingly central in world-creation and world-disclosure; past con-
flicts between ‘instrumental’ and ‘communicative’ rationality seem to have been com-
prehensively outmoded by technological invention and the complexity of new technical
objects. Yet what we hope to have presented in the foregoing is that the Frankfurt School
still has much to offer by way of an analysis of technology. We have consciously not
dismissed out of hand the analyses of first-generation critical theorists on technology;
rather we have identified their limitations and stressed that today’s world of technical
objects simply requires a different theoretical understanding and critical interrogation.
Some substantive analysis from the first generation remains pertinent and incisive, while
some does not. In contrast, and as argued throughout the above, the theoretical infra-
structure provided by first-generation critical theory has not lost its potency and, if
anything, has become more relevant. The focus on identifying latent potentials for
transcendence within the immanent social world offers a plethora of productive avenues
for future research. A critical theory of technology, built using the methodologies pro-
vided by Frankfurt School theorists, could provide a different and much needed critical
account and, as such, serve as a substantial contribution to the broader theoretical
literature.
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Notes
1. The question of nature in critical theory is beyond the scope of this paper (see Vogel, 1996).
2. See Herf’s (1985) study on reactionary modernism and the critique of technology.
3. For an excellent discussion of the role of technology in Heidegger and Spengler’s work, see
Swer (2019).
4. For an extended discussion on Adorno’s views on the potential democratic uses of commu-
nication technologies, see Mariotti (2014).
5. Feenberg (1991, 1995, 1996, 2010) has written prolifically on technology, critical theory and
modernity.
6. A notable exception is Rosa’s theory of social acceleration, which entails a consideration of
technology (Rosa, 2013). Habermas (2003) also contains a discussion of the new genetics.
7. See Chun (2006), Fuchs (2018), Frischmann and Selinger (2018).
8. For a useful survey, see Matthewman (2011).
9. See, for example, Pinch and Bijker (1987), and for an overview Fuller (2006).
10. Ideal Theory refers to a dominant strand of analytic political philosophy. Ideal theorists, such
as Rawlsians, argue that one must theorize justice (or any normative ideal) in isolation from an
analysis of the present social world.
11. For a contemporary example, consider George Monbiot’s attempts to make explicit the
contradiction of infinite growth with finite resources (see https://www.monbiot.com/).
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